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A.C. A UKERMAN AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: WHAT IS THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULING ON
LACHES OR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL?
Standards are not self-actualizing .... The formulations
do not say much until the appeals court, in discussion and
application, gives them life.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In patent infringement suits, alleged infringers have long had
available the equitable defenses of laches and equitable estoppel.2 In
1992 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-the sole appellate
court for patent cases3-sought to redefine and to clarify these de-
fenses in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.4 Sit-
ting en bane, the Court sought not only to redefine the elements of
equitable estoppels but also to clarify the presumption of laches
1. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW § 1.01, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1992).
2. See Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896); Lane & Bodley Co. v.
Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893); Leggett v. Standard Oil Co., 149 U.S. 287 (1893);
Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96 (1885); Mahn v: Harwood, 112 U.S. 354
(1884); 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.01, at 19-5, § 19.05,
at 19-388 (1998); ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
340-50 (3d ed. 1994); Michael Barclay et al., Equitable Defenses in Patent.
Cases, 456 PLI/Pat 639, 666-93 (1996).
3. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1338(a), federal district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction "of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." Id.
4. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
5. Under Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544,
1553-55 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988), and subsequent
Federal Circuit case law, one of the elements of equitable estoppel is unreason-
able delay. However, the Court in A.C. Aukerman expressly overruled these
cases on that point: "Unlike laches, equitable estoppel does not require the
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arising from a prolonged delay in the filing of a patent infringement
suit. Additionally, in A. C. Aukerman, the Court set forth its stan-
dard of review for summary judgment rulings on these equitable de-
fenses. With regard to this standard, the Federal Circuit stated:
On appeal the standard of review of the conclusion of
laches [or equitable estoppel] is abuse of discretion....
If the decision on laches [or equitable estoppel] is
made on summary judgment, there must, in addition, be no
genuine issues of material fact, the burden of proof of an is-
sue must be correctly allocated, and all pertinent factors
must be considered.7
Thus, the standard of review is a two-pronged test, employing
first "de novo" and then "abuse of discretion" standards. Once the
Federal Circuit has determined that there are no genuine issues of
material fact under the "de novo" prong,8 it then reviews, under the
"abuse" prong, the district court's conclusion that the defendant met
its burden in establishing the elements of a defense.
Nevertheless, stating that the Federal Circuit reviews a district
court's conclusion under an abuse of discretion standard does not
passage of an unreasonable period of time in filing suit." Id. at 1041-42.
6. For example, a number of pre-Aukerman Federal Circuit cases ex-
pressly state that although laches is an affirmative defense, the burden of per-
suasion on the issue of laches shifts to the patentee once the defendant estab-
lishes that the patentee delayed more than six years in filing suit. See, e.g.,
Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Sun Studs,
Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1989); James-
bury Corp., 839 F.2d at 1551-52; Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d
1570, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Mainland Indus., Inc. v. Standal's Patents Ltd., 799 F.2d 746,
748 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Leinoffv. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 741-
42 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
However, in A.C. Aukerman, the Federal Circuit clarified that a delay of
more than six years merely creates a rebuttable presumption that does not shift
the burden of persuasion: "[A]t all times, the defendant bears the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion of the affirmative defense of laches." Id. at 1037-38.
7. A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039.
8. Often the Federal Circuit finds that there are genuine issues of material
fact precluding summary judgment and thus reverses the grant of summary
judgment before reaching the "abuse" prong. See, e.g., Gasser Chair Co. v. In-
fanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Stark v. Advanced Mag-
netics, Inc., 29 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d
1304 (Fed. Cir. 1992); A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039.
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necessarily inform litigants and appellate lawyers as to how the Fed-
eral Circuit conducts its review.9 One must instead look to Federal
Circuit case law surrounding summary judgment rulings on laches or
equitable estoppel to determine what "discretion" means in this con-
text. An appellate lawyer must understand the discretionary limits of
the district court in order to articulate, on appeal, how the district
court has or has not transgressed these limits.'
The primary objectives in this comment therefore are (1) to ex-
amine the Federal Circuit's application of this standard of review for
a summary judgment ruling on laches or equitable estoppel and (2) to
assess the fairness of this standard as applied. During the course of
this inquiry, a number of questions arise. Does the Federal Circuit,
under the abuse prong, tend to rubber stamp a district court's holding
or does it engage in more stringent review? In other words, what are
the contours of the district court's discretion? Is the Federal Cir-
cuit's approach desirable given Supreme Court case law" and the
justifications for vesting a district court with discretion?
12
To answer these and related questions, one needs a basic under-
standing of laches and equitable estoppel as well as a preliminary
understanding of the review process in general. Also, one needs a
familiarity with the abuse of discretion standard in addition to the
other federal standards of review. Parts II, III, and IV of this com-
ment attempt to provide the reader with this necessary background
information.
9. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT § 5-10, at 67 (1992) ("As a jural concept dis-
cretion admits of some lack of precision, and formal definitions of the concept
mark only the beginning and not the attainment of understanding.").
10. Seeid. at72.
11. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997) (opining
that the hallmark of abuse of discretion review as applied to a district court's
decision to exclude scientific evidence is true deference and not a more strin-
gent level of review); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (applying
abuse of discretion standard for review of discretionary criminal sentencing
decisions); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (applying
abuse of discretion standard to a district court's Rule 11 determinations), su-
perseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon
Agents, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
12. See infra Part VI.
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After laying this groundwork, Part V reviews A. C. Aukerman, its
standard of review, and all subsequent case law in which the Federal
Circuit has affirmed a trial court's ruling under the abuse prong. Fi-
nally, after exploring how the Federal Circuit applies its standard,
Parts VI and VII attempt to determine whether this application is de-
sirable.
II. DEFENSES OF LACHES AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL: AN OVERVIEW
According to A. C. Aukerman, a laches defense is available to a
defendant accused of infringing a patent when the patentee has inex-
cusably delayed for an unreasonable amount of time in filing an in-
fringement suit and, as a result, has caused material prejudice to the
alleged infringer. 13 Additionally, under A.C. Aukerman, equitable
estoppel is available as a defense if the patentee has affirmatively
communicated to the alleged infringer that it will not enforce its pat-
ent rights against said alleged infringer, and the alleged infringer has
subsequently relied on this communication to its own detriment.
14
Whether an equitable defense applies in an individual case de-
pends on the particular facts of the case and falls to the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge.15 No mechanical rules govern a laches or eq-
uitable estoppel determination. 16  Consequently, even when the
alleged infringer has sufficiently established the elements of a de-
fense, the court may still decline to apply an equitable defense if it
believes that equity so requires. 17 Moreover, the court may make
13. SeeA.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032-33.
14. See id. at 1042-43.
15. See id. at 1028, 1032, 1041 (citing Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus.
Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1551, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Bott v. Four Star
Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Leinoffv. Louis Milona & Sons,
Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also PATRICIA N. BRANTLEY,
PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 1996-97 Edition 159 ("[T]he application of laches is
discretionary.").
16. See A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032 ("With its origins in equity, a de-
termination of laches is not made upon the application of 'mechanical rules."').
17. The court inA.C. Aukerman stated:
Laches remains an equitable judgment of the trial court in light of all
the circumstances. Laches is not established by undue delay and
prejudice. Those factors merely lay the foundation for the trial court's
exercise of discretion. Where there is evidence of other factors which
would make it inequitable to recognize the defense despite undue de-
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this determination during a defendant's pre-trial summary judgment
motion on laches or equitable estoppel. 8
Federal patent statutes do not create a time limit on the period in
which a patentee is allowed to bring an infringement suit.1 9 Since
there is no statute of limitations, courts routinely apply the equitable
doctrines of laches and estoppel as a way of balancing the equities.
20
Nevertheless, 35 U.S.C. § 286, based in law rather than equity, limits
a patentee's recovery of infringement damages to those damages
stemming from acts committed within the six-year period prior to the
filing date of the infringement suit.21 Although § 286 does not oth-
erwise preclude a patentee's right to maintain an action, it does ren-
der unrecoverable any damages accruing more than six years before
filing of the suit. Moreover, even within this six-year period, 35
U.S.C. § 282, based in equity, can further limit the recovery of ac-
crued pre-filing damages when a laches or equitable estoppel defense
appropriately applies to the underlying facts of the case.22 Most
lay and prejudice, the defense may be denied.
Finally, the trial court must, even where the three elements of eq-
uitable estoppel are established, take into consideration any other evi-
dence and facts respecting the equities of the parties in exercising its
discretion and deciding whether to allow the defense of equitable es-
toppel to bar the suit.
Id. at 1036, 1043.
18. See Russell D. Slifer, Comment, En Banc Ruling Bursts More than
Bubbles in Patent Litigation: A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construc-
tion Co. and its Impact, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 335, 336 (1993) ("Although
these defenses are available during litigation, their true power rests in a motion
for summary judgment. . . ."); see also Hon. Robert Holmes Bell, Summary
Judgment in the Federal Courts, 69 MICH. B. J. 1038 (1990) (reviewing the
current trend in federal courts to grant summary judgment more frequently).
19. See 3 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §
17.06[1][d], at 17-76 (2d ed. 1997).
20. See id.
21. The statute provides that "no recovery shall be had for any infringement
committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counter-
claim for infringement in the action." 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1994).
22. Paragraph two of the statute reads:
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the valid-
ity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded:
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or un-
enforceability,
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground
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notably, a determination of laches or equitable estoppel is independ-
ent of a § 286 determination: "Nothing in section 286 suggests that
Congress intended by reenactment of this damage limitation to
eliminate the long recognized defense of laches or to take away a
district court's equitable powers in connection with patent cases. 23
Laches, but not equitable estoppel, is a retroactive defense pre-
cluding only the recovery of pre-filing damages. Laches does not
prevent the patentee either from recovering damages that have ac-
crued after the filing of the complaint or from obtaining an injunc-
tion.
24
A. Use of Laches
To invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, the defendant has the
burden of proving two elements: (1) the plaintiff unreasonably and
inexcusably delayed in bringing suit from the time it knew or should
have known of its claim against the defendant; and (2) the delay op-
erated to materially prejudice the defendant.25  In determining
whether laches is applicable-whether the patentee dealt unfairly
with the alleged infringer in delaying suit-the trial judge must con-
sider factors such as (1) the length of the delay, (2) the seriousness of
the prejudice, (3) the reasonableness of the excuse, and (4) the con-
duct of the defendant.26 As stated previously, no hard and fast rules
specified in part II of this title as a condition for patentability,
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to com-
ply with any requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title,
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
The Federal Circuit noted that the patent laws recodified in 1952 specifi-
cally retained the equitable defenses (e.g., laches, estoppel, and unclean hands)
in 35 U.S.C. § 282. See A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029 (citing P.J. Fede-
rico, Commentary on the New Patent Law, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (West 1954));
accord J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
23. A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1030.
24. See id. at 1040 (citing Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 741, for the proposition that
"laches bars damages for a patent defendant's pre-filing infringement but not
for post-filing damages or injunctive relief unless elements of estoppel are es-
tablished") (emphasis added). As the court in A.C. Aukerman noted, equitable
estoppel completely bars all relief on a claim. See id. at 1041.
25. See id. at 1032.
26. See id. at 1034 (stating that "a district court must weigh all pertinent
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govern a laches determination. Hence, even if the defendant is suc-
cessful in establishing the elements of laches, the trial judge may still
deny the application of the doctrine based on the defendant's con-
duct.
Nonetheless, a delay of more than six years in filing suit creates
a rebuttable presumption that such a long delay has solidly estab-
lished the two basic elements of a laches defense. In order to rebut
this presumption, the plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence
showing either (1) that its delay was nevertheless reasonable or (2)
that its delay in fact did not materially prejudice the defendant.
28
Material prejudice can consist of economic prejudice occurring when
the defendant suffers monetary loss by a harmful change in its eco-
nomic position that an earlier suit could have prevented.2 9 Addition-
ally, material prejudice can be evidentiary prejudice-including loss
of records and lack of memory-the type of evidentiary prejudice
which prevents the defendant from presenting a "full and fair defense
on the merits" and undermines the "court's ability to judge the
facts."30 Once the plaintiff, however, has introduced evidence suffi-
cient to "burst the bubble" of presumption-raised genuine issues of
fact-then the defendant has the burden of proving both elements of
laches by a preponderance of the evidence.
31
facts and equities in making a decision on the laches defense").
27. See id. at 1037 (explaining that "[w]ithout the presumption, the two
facts of unreasonable delay and prejudice might reasonably be inferred from
the length of the delay, but not necessarily," however, "[w]ith the presumption,
these facts must be inferred, absent rebuttal evidence"); see also Hemstreet v.
Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (agreeing
that unreasonable delay and prejudice must be inferred from the plaintiffs de-
lay of more than six years but finding that the plaintiff had "burst" this pre-
sumption by introducing evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact).
28. SeeA.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038.
29. See id. at 1033 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co., 693
F.2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1982); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Lockwood
Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 1120, 1124 (6th Cir. 1973)); see also Meyers v. Asics
Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (asserting that there must be a
nexus between the prejudice suffered by the defendant and the delay in order to
prove laches).
30. A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033.
31. See id. at 1037-38, 1045.
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B. Use of Equitable Estoppel
To establish sufficiently an equitable estoppel defense, the al-
leged infringer has the burden of proving (1) that the patentee has al-
ready communicated to the alleged infringer either by its words, si-
lence, or conduct that it would not enforce its patent rights against
said alleged infringer; (2) that the alleged infringer has relied on this
communication; and (3) that the alleged infringer, because of its reli-
ance, would be materially prejudiced if the court allows the patentee
to proceed with its claim. 2 Although laches has a rebuttable pre-
sumption based on a lapse of time, no such presumption exists for
equitable estoppel.33 Instead, conduct, rather than time, triggers an
estoppel defense. Consequently, the defendant at all times carries the
burden of proving the elements of equitable estoppel by a preponder-
ance of the evidence regardless of any delay.
34
Moreover, only actual evidence-not conclusory statements-
can establish reliance, i.e., can establish that the patentee's communi-
cation reasonably influenced the defendant to take certain action.
35
Reliance necessarily requires some type of relationship between the
patentee and alleged infringer, a relationship whereby affirmative
conduct on the part of the patentee lulls the alleged infringer into a
false sense of security.36
Finally, unlike laches, estoppel serves as a complete bar to re-
covery.37 Not only does this defense preclude all past and prospec-
five recovery of damages, but it also renders an injunction unavail-
able as well.
38
32. See id. at 1041-43.
33. See id. at 1043.
34. See id. at 1042-43, 1046 (defining the elements of equitable estoppel
and noting that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard also applies to eq-
uitable estoppel, "absent special circumstances, such as fraud or intentional
misconduct").
35. See Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
36. SeeA.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d 1020 at 1043.
37. See id. at 1041 (citing Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc.,
839 F.2d 1544, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
38. See id.
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III. PURPOSE OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND THE NEED FOR A
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before discussing the different federal standards of review, it is
instructive to examine the review process in general. The purpose of
appellate review is two-fold: (1) to provide litigants with the oppor-
tunity to correct errors made in a lower court and (2) to promote
harmony and uniformity among the courts.39 The error-correcting
function of an appellate court, however, is not intended to produce
trials that are error-free-only to correct errors that affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties.40 In addition, the procedural objectives
of finality and efficiency influence the appellate process.41 "Conse-
quently, the law of appeal can be viewed as a fine balance of concern
for correctness and uniformity of disposition on one hand, and effi-
ciency and finality on the other."
42
Considering the objectives of appellate review, a standard or
intensity of review is absolutely required.43 A standard of review is
required to promote finality by ensuring that at some point the litiga-
tion will come to an end and to 4romote efficiency by ensuring that
judicial resources are conserved.
In order to fulfill these objectives, the standard or intensity of
review needs to be adjusted according to the complexity and nature
of the issue under consideration.45 Issues that involve only factual
39. See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING
CIVIL PROCEDURE 417 (2d ed. 1994); see also MARSHALL HOUTS ET AL., ART
OF ADVOCACY-APPEALS § 1.11, at 1-42 to 1-45 (1990) (instructing that there
are three types of appeals: (1) appeals to correct error, (2) appeals to make
new law, and (3) appeals to amplify or clarify existing law). Harmony and
uniformity are generated by a reviewing court when it clarifies existing law or
creates new law for lower courts to apply.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994); FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
41. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 39, at 417.
42. Id. at417-18.
43. Intensity means the degree to which the appellate court will or will not
defer to the lower court's decision. Id. at 439.
44. See id. at 439-40. For example, an appropriate standard of review en-
sures that at some point the litigation will come to an end, regardless of the
lack of certainty surrounding the issues. Likewise, where the trial court is as
competent as the appellate court to decide a matter, an appropriate standard of
review will result in deference to the trial court's decision and will discourage
the number of appeals, thereby promoting judicial efficiency. See id.
45. See id. at 439.
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determinations are best left for the trier of fact, who hears all the evi-
dence, while issues that primarily deal with the application of law
may be better suited for an appellate court which specializes in that
particular area of the law.46 Accordingly, the standard of review
serves a review-limitation function: 47  It "describes the positive
authority the appellate court wields in its review function," 48 or in
other words, the deference that the appellate court will confer on the
decisions of a lower court.
Significantly, the particular standard of review "label" or
"phrase" used by an appellate court in its review process affects the
outcome of the case on appeal: It not only guides the petitioner in
framing the issues for appeal but also helps to direct the appellate
court in its examination of the trial court's earlier ruling. In fact,
most circuits formally require both litigating parties to discuss the
appropriate standard of review in the appeals brief,49 and many
judges who offer appellate tips advise that such standards be very
carefully addressed on appeal.50 From an appellant's point of view,
knowing the appropriate standard before appeal certainly helps an
appellant realistically evaluate its chances of success and to avoid
long shots. Also, knowing the standard of review in advance of ap-
peal helps all parties frame the issues so that they are better suited for
resolution on appeal.51 From an appellate court's point of view,
knowing the standard of review beforehand helps the appeals court
focus more quickly on what is important on appeal. All of these con-
siderations help conserve not only time and money for all litigants
involved but also judicial and societal resources as well.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that a mere standard
of review "label" may not clearly indicate what the appeals court is
doing in practice. In reality, the court must actually apply the
46. See id.
47. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 1-9 to 1-10.
48. Id. § 1.01, at 1-3.
49. See, e.g., 3D CIR. R. 21(1)(A)(h); 9TH CIR. R. 28-2.5; 11 TH CIR. R. 28-
26(g).
50. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, supra note 9, at 58 ; CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra note 1, § 1.02, at 1-20 to 1-21.
51. Standards of review "'indicate the decibel level at which the appellate
advocate must play to catch the judicial ear."' CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra
note 1, § 1.02, at 1-19 (citation omitted).
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standard in order to define it: '"In law as elsewhere words of many-
hued meanings derive their scope from the use to which they are
put.'
' 52
Thus, for the most part, linguistically defining the standard de-
termines how a reviewing judge will approach the issues on appeal
and how an attorney must frame them in order to prevail. Nonethe-
less, phrasing the standard in a particular way does not necessarily
communicate how the appellate court will actually review the issues.
"Standards are not self-actualizing .... The formulations do not say
much until the appeals court, in discussion and application, gives
them life."53
IV. FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Before analyzing how the Federal Circuit has applied the stan-
dard of review set forth in A. C. Aukerman, it is helpful to survey the
different federal review standards.
The four principal standards of review are (1) de novo, (2)
clearly erroneous, (3) reasonableness, and (4) abuse of discretion.
These standards represent the different levels of deference that an
appellate court gives to trial court rulings. 54 "A standard of review is
a shorthand way of describing approximately where on a continuum
ranging from 100% substitution of judgment to total deference the
intensity of review lies for a particular issue."55 Each standard will
briefly be considered in turn.
A. De Novo Standard
In de novo review, the appellate court makes its own determina-
tion based only on the record of the court below and freely substi-
tutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.5 6 Appellate courts
apply the de novo standard mostly to "[q]uestions of statutory intent,
sufficiency of a defense, adequacy of jury instructions, admission of
evidence, and choice of law."5 7 In addition, the grant or denial of
52. Id. § 1.02, at 1-16 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 1-2.
54. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 39, at 439-40.
55. Id. at 440.
56. Seeid. at441.
57. Id.
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certain motions-such as summary judgment, directed verdict, and
judgment as a matter of law-also receives de novo review because
such rulings involve judgment 'as a matter of law."' 58 It is impor-
tant to note that, depending on its context, a summary judgment rul-
ing may involve more than a single standard of review. For example,
the summary judgment ruling itself might be the result of a prior dis-
cretionary determination, such as an evidentiary ruling, that is re-
viewed for abuse of discretion.
59
While de novo review usually means that the appellate court
will make an independent determination of the issue on appeal, it
does not mean that the appellate court will retry the entire case to
make factual findings.60  Rather, "de novo" signifies a standard
which confers no particular deference to the trial court's conclu-
sions. On de novo review, an appellate court may review not onl y
the trial court's conclusions but also its legal analysis as well. 1
Since an appellate court that is engaged in de novo review is not at
liberty to engage in factfmding, it will, of necessity, afford deference
to a trial court's factual findings.
62
B. Clearly Erroneous Standard
The clearly erroneous standard-which is applied to findings of
fact made by the trial court63 -gives substantial deference to the trial
court's determination. 64 More clearly defined, the appellate court
will set aside a trial court's findings only "when... the reviewing
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997) (holding
that summary judgment was proper where the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in excluding expert testimony).
60. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31
(1984) (stating that de novo review does not mean "review of the ultimate
judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all
the evidence").
61. "Any expertise possessed by the district court will inform the structure
and content of its conclusions of law and thereby become evident to the re-
viewing court." Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991).
62. See, e.g., Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 713-14
(1986) (stating that if the appellate court believes the trial court's factual find-
ings are clearly erroneous, it must remand to the trial court, rather than making
its own factual findings).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
64. See SHREVE & RAvEN-HANSEN, supra note 39, at 443.
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court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed., 65 Furthermore, "conviction
that a mistake has been committed" means that the trial judge has
done something beyond simply making a choice between two plausi-
ble views of the evidence. 6 Nonetheless, an appellate court will
necessarily engage in some reweighing of the evidence in order to
determine whether or not a trial court has committed clear error.
67
Most appropriately, an "appellate court should affirm factfindings
only after careful review of each individual claim and on-record sup-
port, since 'Congress surely did not intend Rule 52(a) to constrict as
a Victorian corset, binding the courts of appeals to the findings of the
district court absent a careful and fitting examination.'
68
C. Reasonableness Standard
Appellate courts apply a reasonableness standard, also a defer-
ential standard, to jury verdicts and to determinations made by an
administrative agency. 69 Appellate courts show deference to jury
findings because "the jury's greater numbers should enhance its fact-
finding ability and dilute its biases, entitling its findings to greater
weight on appeal., 70 Likewise, an administrative agency's expertise
in a certain area entitles its findings to carry greater weight on appeal
than findings made by a single judge who is not a specialist in that
area.
71
65. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
66. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) ("If
the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though con-
vinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently."); see also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S.
338, 341 (1949) ("[W]here the evidence would support a conclusion either way
but where the trial court has decided it to weigh more heavily for the defen-
dants[,] [s]uch a choice between two permissible views of the weight of the
evidence is not 'clearly erroneous."').
67. See CHILDRESS & DAvIS, supra note 1, § 2.05, at 2-35.
68. Id. at 2-36 (footnote omitted).
69. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 39, at 444-45.
70. Id. at 444.
71. Seeid. at445.
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D. Abuse of Discretion Standard
Finally, the abuse of discretion standard cited by the Federal
Circuit for its second prong in A.C. Aukerman is another deferential
standard; and it varies in intensity depending on the nature of the dis-
cretionary issue.72 "[T]here is no such thing as one abuse of discre-
tion standard. 73 For example, the standard of review applied to a
discretionary decision involving the date set for trial or the grant of a
one-day continuance would seemingly not be the same standard ap-
plied to a discretionary decision involving the award of attorney
fees.74 Further complicating matters is the fact that even a single is-
sue may deserve a varying standard of review; a "motion for new
trial [] may get different deference under 'the' abuse of discretion
standard depending on the basis for new trial argued." 75
In the simplest understanding of the term, therefore, "discretion"
refers to the latitude allowed a trial court in making a ruling where
fixed rules of law are not rigidly binding.76 Some courts may em-
ploy a broad definition of discretion by focusing on reasonableness
77
and hence by finding abuse "only where no reasonable man would
take the view adopted by the trial court." 78 Proceeding with this
72. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (denoting
that "[t]he mere statement that a decision lies within the discretion of the trial
court does little to shed light on its reviewability... [and] means merely that
the decision is uncontrolled by fixed principles or rules of law") (citing
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636-43 (1971) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Ju-
dicial Discretion]); Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31
EMoRY L.J. 747, 762 (1982).
73. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 4.01, at 4-13.
74. See id. at 4-14 to 4-15.
75. Id.
76. As eloquently stated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit:
[Wlhen we say that a decision is discretionary, or that a district court
has discretion to grant or deny a motion, we do not mean that the dis-
trict court may do whatever pleases it. The phrase means instead that
the court has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be dis-
turbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by
any mistake of law.
Kem v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984).
77. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 4.21, at 4-156.
78. Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942); accord
Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 750 F.2d 947, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("If
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial
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definition, an appellate court gives great latitude to the trial judge
and therefore seldom vacates discretionary decisions of the lower
court. Cases in this category have involved criminal sentencing,
79
8 81special verdict,80 and forum non conveniens.
At the other end of the discretion spectrum, an appellate court
may overrule a lower court's discretionary ruling simply because it
would have reached a different conclusion if more than one plausible
conclusion could be drawn from the evidence. 82 As a result, even
though the decision is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge, an appellate court following this definition of discretion will
refuse to put its stamp of approval on the lower court's ruling even
though the lower court's ruling is plausible. Some cases decided in
this manner have included those concerning declaratory83 and de-
fault 84 judgments.
Finally, there are courts whose definition and application of the
abuse of discretion standard fall in between the two extremes previ-
ously discussed. These courts state that a trial court's decision
should remain undisturbed unless upon the whole record the re-
viewing court is left with "'a "definite and firm conviction" that the
court below committed a clear error of judgment' in the conclusion
it reached.85 Courts adopting this definition do more than question
whether any "reasonable man would take the view adopted" but stop
court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.") (quoting
Delno, 124 F.2d at 967).
79. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
80. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1948). For discussion of Skidmore as it relates to the issue of affording broad
discretion to a trial court's decision, see Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra
note 72, at 651.
81. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
82. See, e.g., New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc. v. State Liquor
Auth., 34 N.E.2d 316 (N.Y. 1941). For discussion of this case as it relates to
the narrow discretion afforded a trial court's decision, see Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion, supra note 72, at 651-52.
83. See e.g., Long v. Long, 119 N.Y.S.2d. 341 (App. Div. 1953); Rosen-
wald v. Rosenwald, 73 N.Y.S.2d 710 (App. Div. 1947).
84. See e.g., Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
85. Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, 750 F.2d 903, 917 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272,
1275 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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short of substituting their own judgment for that of the trial court's
when more than one conclusion is plausible. Hence, this definition
encourages an intermediate approach compared to the other two:
It could be said, then, that in run-of-the-mill discretionary
calls, review applies differently by the context, facts, and
factors, but that many times the actual level of deference
boils down to one similar to that used for the clearly erro-
neous rule. As a general proposition, then, abuse of discre-
tion deference is closer to a clear error test than to the jury
review test of irrationality. 6
A point that ought to be made now-but one which will be re-
visited in Part Vil-is that even under an abuse of discretion inquiry,
an appeals court may review legal errors without any deference.
87
This is simply part of the appellate body's law-making function:
[F]requently [the] factors and the relevant considerations
[that are to be made by the district court] are to be specified
by, and redefined in, the appellate body as part of its law-
making function. They may be more like questions of law,
rather than exercises of discretion, since the district court's
decision should not control broadly how other judges would
make this type of decision. That is, the question no longer
is an application of personal judgment to supervisory facts
and issues, but a broader legal determination of what facts
and issue[s] should determine generically this category of
overall choice.... [A question of] law should be substi-
tuted freely on appeal while [a question of] true discretion
gets deference-both under an abuse of discretion label.
88
To recapitulate, federal appellate courts have adopted four prin-
cipal standards of review-de novo, clearly erroneous, reasonable-
ness, and abuse of discretion. Usually, the nature of the matter re-
viewed dictates the use of one standard over another.
86. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 4.21, at 4-163.
87. See id. §4.01, at4-10.
88. Id. § 4.01, at 4-3 to 4-5 (parentheses and footnotes omitted).
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V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RULING ON LACHES OR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Besides seeking to clarify the defenses of laches and equitable
estoppel, the Federal Circuit in A.C. Aukerman also sought to define
the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment on either de-
fense. 89 The Federal Circuit stated that "[o]n appeal the standard of
review of the conclusion of laches [or equitable estoppel] is abuse of
discretion... [and] [i]f the decision... is made on summary judg-
ment, there must, in addition, be no genuine issues of material
fact."90 Thus, according to A.C. Aukerman, the standard of review is
a two-pronged test. Once the Federal Circuit has determined that
there is no genuine issue of material fact,91 it then reviews under the
"abuse" prong the district court's conclusion that the defendant has
met its burden of proof in establishing the elements of a defense.
It is under this second prong-the abuse prong-that questions
arise: Where on the discretion spectrum does the Federal Circuit's
approach fall? Does the Federal Circuit simply "rubber stamp" the
trial court's holding? Indeed, the Supreme Court has opined that the
hallmark of abuse of discretion review is true deference and not a
more stringent level of review.
92
One approach to answering these questions is to examine cases
where one is likely to find that the Federal Circuit was deferential.
In other words, the approach would be to examine all case law since
A. C. Aukerman where the Federal Circuit has affirmed a district
court's grant of summary judgment on laches or equitable estoppel.93
89. Note that, in general, a denial of summary judgment is interlocutory and
nonappealable. See, e.g., Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
90. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1039
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en bane).
91. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
92. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997).
93. See, e.g., Wanlass v. General Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(affirming summary judgment on laches); Scholle Corp. v. Blackhawk Mold-
ing Co., 133 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment on eq-
uitable estoppel); Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (vacating summary judgment on laches and equitable estoppel granted in
favor of one defendant while affirming summary judgment on laches granted
for seven other defendants); ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp.,
52 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment on equitable
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In affmning, did the Federal Circuit give true deference to the district
court's conclusion, or did it make a more stringent inquiry? If it
made a more stringent inquiry, is this appropriate in light of Supreme
Court rulings regarding the application of an abuse of discretion
standard?94 Is this approach desirable given the reasons for vesting a
district court with discretion?
95
A. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction
In A. C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction,96 the pat-
entee brought suit against the defendant for infringement of its pat-
ents relating to a method and device for creating concrete highway
barriers. 97 The district court granted summary judgment against the
patentee on the grounds that laches and equitable estoppel barred its
claims. 98
On appeal, the Federal Circuit clarified the elements of equitable
estoppel and the laches presumption that arises after six years.99 In
particular, it held that unreasonable delay-an element of laches-
was not an element of equitable estoppel. 00 Hence, the Federal Cir-
cuit expressly overruled prior cases on this point. 1 1 Also, the Fed-
eral Circuit clarified that the laches presumption, which arises after a
delay of more than six years in filing a patent suit, is rebuttable and
estoppel); Technology For Energy Corp. v. Computational Sys., Inc., Nos. 92-
1542, 92-1551, 1993 WL 366350, 6 F.3d 788 (Table) (Fed. Cir. Sept. 21,
1993) (affirming summary judgment on laches).
94. See, e.g., General Elec. Co., 118 S. Ct. at 512 (1997) (holding that the
abuse of discretion standard applied to a district court's decision to exclude
scientific evidence); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (applying
abuse of discretion standard for review of discretionary criminal sentencing
decisions); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (applying
abuse of discretion standard to a district court's Rule 11 determinations), su-
perseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon
Agents, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
95. See infra Part VI.
96. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
97. See id. at 1026-27.
98. See id. at 1027.
99. See id. at 1039-44.
100. See id. at 1042.
101. See id.
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does not shift the burden of persuasion. 0 2 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit expressly overruled prior cases suggesting otherwise.
10 3
In addition, the Federal Circuit defined the standard of review
for a summary judgment ruling on laches or equitable estoppel in the
following manner:
On appeal the standard of review of the conclusion of
laches [or equitable estoppel] is abuse of discretion. An ap-
pellate court, however, may set aside a discretionary deci-
sion if the decision rests on an erroneous interpretation of
the law or on clearly erroneous factual underpinnings. If
such error is absent, the determination can be overturned
only if the trial court's decision represents an unreasonable
judgment in weighing relevant factors ...
If the decision on laches is made on summary judg-
ment, there must, in addition, be no genuine issues of mate-
rial fact, the burden of proof of an issue must be correctly
allocated, and all pertinent factors must be considered.
10 4
In applying the above standard to the district court's conclusion
of laches and equitable estoppel, the Federal Circuit held that sum-
mary judgment was improper on both defenses for a number of rea-
sons. For the finding of laches, the Federal Circuit held that the dis-
trict court had misapplied the presumption by shifting the burden of
persuasion to the patentee.' 0 5 Also, the district court had improperly
resolved a material issue against the patentee by finding that the de-
fendant's conduct did not disrupt the laches period. 10 6 In particular,
the defendant's conduct changed during the delay period: It began
manufacturing its own device and greatly increased the amount of
concrete wall it poured. 107 This conduct was a relevant factor in
finding the patentee's delay unreasonable, and thus resolving this is-
sue against the patentee was inappropriate on summary judgment. 1
08
102. See id. at 1035-58.
103. See id. at 1038-39.
104. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
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For the finding of equitable estoppel, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court had drawn unfavorable inferences against the
patentee. 10 9 Whether the patentee's correspondence and later silence
would have led one in the defendant's position to infer that the pat-
entee did not intend to assert its patent rights was a material issue
that should not have been resolved against the patentee on summary
judgment.
110
B. Application of the Standard: Cases Affirmed on Appeal
It is no surprise that when the Federal Circuit has reversed or
vacated a grant of summary judgment on laches or equitable estop-
pel,"' it engaged in plenary review rather than deferring to the dis-
trict court's conclusions. In these cases the Federal Circuit held that
genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. There
were either genuine issues regarding the conduct of the parties or
genuine issues as to how the inferences should be drawn. Either
way, a grant of summary judgement was improper. 112 But what has
the Federal Circuit done in those cases where it affirmed a grant of
summary judgment? Did it simply "rubber stamp" the lower court's
determination under the abuse inquiry? In other words, what are the
contours of the district court's exercise of this discretion?
The following five cases, instructive on this score, indicate that
even when affirming the district court after an abuse inquiry, the
Federal Circuit engages in plenary review to determine whether the
district court has "abused" its discretion. In other words, it engages
in plenary review to determine whether the district court based its
conclusion on "an erroneous interpretation of the law or on clearly
erroneous factual underpinnings," or unreasonably weighed relevant
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1039, 1043-44.
111. See, e.g., Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 29 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1992); A.C. Aukerman
Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
112. See Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461-62 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (stating that factual disputes are not to be resolved on summary judg-
ment), overruled on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038-39 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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factors.13 This plenary review is therefore a more stringent standard
of review than that afforded by true deference and serves to limit a
district court's discretion.
1. Wanlass v. General Electric Co.
The most recent case in which the Federal Circuit has affirmed
the grant of summary judgment on laches is Wanlass v. General
Electric Co.114 The patentee in Wanlass brought suit against GE for
infringement of its single-phase electric motor patent, and the district
court ruled in favor of the defendant's summary judgment motion on
laches.
115
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's finding
that Wanlass had constructive knowledge of the alleged infringement
more than six years prior to filing suit, and therefore the Aukerman
presumption applied." 6 The Federal Circuit relied upon the follow-
ing facts to ascertain whether the district court abused its discretion
in finding constructive knowledge: (1) there were prior dealings
between the parties concerning this invention, namely negotiations
for a license and claims of patent invalidity; (2) the defendant en-
gaged in the "open and notorious sale of easily testable products";
and (3) once the plaintiff tested the defendant's products, it easily
found infringement."1
7
The Federal Circuit rejected the evidence proffered by the pat-
entee to overcome the presumption of unreasonable delay and preju-
dice." 8 Specifically, as to the reasonableness of the delay, the court
conducted a plenary review of the record and rejected the patentee's
arguments that testing defendant's products would have been too
burdensome" 9 or that the defendant's lack of understanding of the
invention justified the delay.
120
Also, the Federal Circuit stated that the appellants had "fail[ed]
to rebut the presumption of prejudice because they did not offer
113. See A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039.
114. 148 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
115. See id. at 1336.
116. See id. at 1340.
117. See id. at 1339-40.
118. Seeid. at 1340.
119. Seeid. at 1339.
120. See id. at 1340.
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credible evidence that GE suffered no prejudice."'12  In coming to
this conclusion, the Federal Circuit assessed whether the patentee
had demonstrated a lack of evidentiary prejudice by pointing to the
defendant's policy of disposing of old products. 122 The Court con-
cluded that the patentee had not.
12 3
Whatever one's opinion is regarding the Federal Circuit's hold-
ing in this case, 124 it is indisputable that the Federal Circuit did not
simply defer to the district court's conclusions. In fact, the Federal
Circuit barely even mentioned the district court's analysis. Rather,
the Federal Circuit weighed the evidence and made its own determi-
nation on laches.
2. Scholle Corp. v. Blackhawk Molding Co.
In another case on point, Scholle Corp. v. Blackhawk Molding
Co.,125 the patentee filed suit against the defendant for making valved
bottle caps that allegedly infringed its patent. 126 Defendant in turn
filed a motion for summary judgment on equitable estoppel. 127 The
district court-finding that the defendant had established all elements
of equitable estoppel-granted the motion.1
28
Without providing any analysis, the Federal Circuit began its
opinion by stating that there were no genuine issues of material fact;
and it would therefore review the equitable estoppel finding under
the abuse of discretion prong.12 9 Thus, it would determine, under the
abuse prong, whether the defendant had failed to satisfy two of the
three elements of estoppel as alleged by the patentee. 130 Specifically,
the patentee contended that it had not misled the defendant and
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1341-43 (Rader, J., dissenting).
125. 133 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
126. See id. at 1470.
127. See id. at 1471.
128. See id.
129. See id. ("Here, we find no infirmity in the district court's determination
that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we turn to the
holding of equitable estoppel.").
130. See id. at 1472-73.
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furthermore that the defendant had not relied on the patentee's con-
duct.'
3 '
With its own analysis of the undisputed facts, the Federal Circuit
explained how the patentee's conduct was misleading, and why the
factors emphasized by the patentee did not bar such a finding.132 In
particular, the patentee had a duty to speak in light of (1) numerous
infringement discussions between the parties and (2) the patentee's
knowledge that the defendant considered its cap a "non-infringing
design-around product."'133 The Federal Circuit also dismissed-
though in a more deferential fashion-the patentee's argument that
its ongoing litigation with a third party was evidence that its conduct
was not misleading, i.e., evidence that it did not intend to waive its
patent rights.134 While acknowledging that ongoing litigation can be
a factor in an estoppel defense, the Federal Circuit noted that the
district court did not err by affording this factor little weight.
135
As to the finding of reliance, the Federal Circuit stated that de-
fendant's tardiness in obtaining a written opinion of noninfringement
did not refute such a finding, nor did the fact that defendant began
test marketing its product before it communicated with the pat-
entee.
136
While the Federal Circuit's approach in Scholle may have been
more deferential than that taken in Wanlass,'37 its approach never-
theless was plenary in nature. The Federal Circuit did more than
merely state that the district court's conclusions were plausible and
therefore should not be disturbed.
3. Hall v. Aqua Queen Manufacturing, Inc.
In Hall v. Aqua Queen Manufacturing, Inc.,138 the patentee sued
eight defendants for infringement of its waterbed patent. 139  On
summary judgment, the district court ruled that the patentee's claims
131. See id. at 1472.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 1472.
134. See id. at 1472-73.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1473.
137. See id. at 1472-73 (discussing the ongoing litigation factor).
138. 93 F.3d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
139. See id. at 1552.
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were barred for failure to rebut the presumption of laches, which had
been established by its delay in filing suit for more than six years. 1
40
The Aukerman presumption places a burden of production
on the patentee.... This burden of production relates to
both the excusability of the delay and the lack of prejudice
resulting from the delay. Importantly, where the patentee
fails to meet this burden of production by coming forward
with either affirmative evidence of a lack of prejudice or a
legally cognizable excuse for its delay in filing suit, the two
facts of unreasonable delay and prejudice "must be in-
ferred."
141
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found summary judgment to be
appropriate for seven defendants because the patentee had presented
no evidence that could lead a rational trier of fact to find in its fa-
vor.142 The patentee had failed to offer a legally cognizable excuse
for its delay and had failed to offer any evidence that the delay was
not prejudicial to the defendants. 143 Notably, however, the patentee
had offered three excuses for its delay-poverty, inability to find le-
gal representation, and ongoing litigation. 144 Nonetheless, the Fed-
eral Circuit, citing numerous case law rather than the district court's
conclusions, stated that the first two excuses were not legally cogni-
zable.
145
With regard to the final excuse-the pendency of ongoing liti-
gation with an outside party-the Federal Circuit stated that the facts
of Hall justified the district court's conclusion that this excuse was
also not legally cognizable. 146 The district court rejected the excuse
proffered by the patentee because the patentee had not informed any
of the defendants that it planned to sue them next. 147 On this issue,
the Federal Circuit stated that, although there is no rigid notice re-
quirement for an "ongoing litigation" excuse, there are times when
prior contacts between the parties do require such a notice for the
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1553-54.
142. See id. at 1552-53.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1553.
145. See id. at 1554.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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excuse to be legally cognizable. 148 The Federal Circuit thought Hall
to be one such occasion: "Hall contends that such notice was unnec-
essary.... We are not persuaded."'
149
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the patentee's claim that
the district court had abused its discretion in applying the laches de-
fense because the equities weighed in favor of the patentee; the pat-
entee asserted that defendants had engaged in willful infringement
and therefore ought to be denied the laches defense even if they
could establish the elements. 150 In addressing this issue, the Federal
Circuit meticulously presented the evidence that undermined the pat-
entee's argument for willful infringement. 151 It pointed to invalidity
opinion letters relied on by the defendants and to a lack of evidence
regarding an industry-wide conspiracy. 152 "[N]either of Hall's con-
tentions regarding the district court's final weighing of the equities
on laches is persuasive. Certainly, the district court's weighing of
the equities was within its discretion, i.e., was not manifestly unrea-
sonable."
153
Again, in Hall, as in the previously discussed cases, the Federal
Circuit conducted a full analysis regarding the laches defense and
came to its own conclusion that the application of laches was appro-
priate in this case.
4. ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp.
In another case, ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics
Corp.,154 the patentee brought suit against an alleged infringer of a
robot arm patent, and the district court granted defendant's summary
judgment motion on equitable estoppel. 155 On appeal, the patentee
argued that the three elements of estoppel had not been satisfied; but
for each element the Federal Circuit explained why the patentee's ar-
guments were not persuasive. 156 First, the patentee had engaged in
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1555.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. 52 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
155. See id. at 1063.
156. See id. at 1064-65.
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misleading conduct because it discussed the possibility of infringe-
ment with the defendant, but neither threatened suit nor did anything
further for over five years.' 5 7 Second, the defendant had relied on
the patentee's conduct because, even after the defendant asserted that
it did not infringe, the patentee continued business relations with the
defendant by granting licenses for other patented inventions.1 58 Fi-
nally, the defendant's reliance was prejudicial because it continued
marketing and development in the field of the invention instead of
modifying its behavior as it had done for other inventions belonging
to the patentee.'59
Accordingly, after an independent review of the record, the Fed-
eral Circuit agreed with the trial court that the defendant had satisfied
each element of estoppel and therefore summary judgment had been
proper: "Because the trial court correctly found that [defendant]
proved each of the elements of estoppel and because no other evi-
dence or facts respecting the equities of the parties precludes the ap-
plication of estoppel in this case, the trial court's grant of summary
judgment based on estoppel is affirmed."' 60 Thus, in coming to the
conclusion that the district court's estoppel determination was "cor-
rect," the Federal Circuit did more than simply defer to the district
court.
5. Technology for Energy Corp. v. Computational Systems, Inc.
Finally, in Technology for Energy Corp. v. Computational Sys-
tems, Inc.,161 the patentee of a vibration monitoring device filed suit
against the defendant for patent infringement. The defendant moved
for summary judgment on the issue of laches, and the district court
granted its motion.'
62
On appeal, the patentee asserted that the defendant did not es-
tablish the elements of laches.' 63 Namely, the patentee argued that
the district court improperly imputed knowledge of infringement to
157. See id. at 1064.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 1065.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Nos. 92-1542, 92-1551, 1993 WL 366350, 6 F.3d 788 (Table) (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 21, 1993).
162. See id. at*1.
163. See id. at *7.
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the patentee and failed to take the patentee's financial situation into
account. 164  Furthermore, the patentee contended that the district
court's decision was based on an erroneous factual underpinning and
that the defendant had failed to establish reliance.
165
The Federal Circuit explained that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding unreasonable delay, even if the district
court's decision rested on an erroneous factual underpinning, as
claimed by the patentee. 166 Specifically, the Court stated that there
was enough evidence to support a finding that the patentee knew of
the infringement at least four years before filing suit.167 Also, the
patentee's financial situation in no way prohibited it from bringing
an earlier infringement suit.
168
Moreover, the Federal Circuit was "convinced" that the defen-
dant had met its burden in establishing prejudice because it consid-
erably expanded its business operations during the delay period after
obtaining advice from outside counsel on infringement.1
6 9
This opinion, an unpublished one, is by far the most deferential
of all the opinions previously discussed. Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit was "convinced" that the elements of laches had been estab-
lished, despite the fact that the district court's decision quite possibly
rested on an erroneous factual determination. The fact that this was
an unpublished opinion may explain the lack of analysis conducted
by the Court as compared to the other cases.
C. Conclusion
Accordingly, when the Federal Circuit has affirmed a summary
judgment ruling on laches or equitable estoppel under an abuse in-
quiry, it has done so only after making an independent determination
of whether the elements of a defense have been properly established.
In each case discussed above, the Federal Circuit did not merely
"rubber stamp" the district court's conclusions by stating that these
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. The Court did not provide any analysis as to why this four-year
delay was unreasonable, except to the extent that there was no excuse at all.
168. See id.
169. See id. at *8.
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conclusions were plausible and therefore should not be disturbed.
Rather, the Federal Circuit engaged in some form of plenary re-
view-reweighing of the evidence-to make its own determination
regarding the application of laches or equitable estoppel. This form
of review ensures that the district court's legal conclusion is not
plagued by an erroneous view of the law, a clearly erroneous assess-
ment of the evidence, or an unreasonable judgment in weighing rele-
vant factors. Consequently, the contours of a district court's exercise
of discretion do not appear to be indiscriminate or unaccountably
broad. Whether this degree of deference-or lack thereof-is both
legitimate and desirable is a topic to be considered in the next sec-
tion. What justifications are there for the Federal Circuit's ap-
proach? In order to answer this question, one must first consider the
overall justifications for an abuse of discretion standard as compared
to a de novo standard.
VI. ABUSE OF DISCRETION VERSUS DE Novo: JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE STANDARD
A. Justificationfor Abuse of Discretion Review
Our legal system confers discretionary power on trial judges for
several reasons. The most obvious reason arises from the very nature
of the relationship between a trial judge and the parties in a dispute.
A trial judge has a superior opportunity to observe the evidence
170
and the credibility of witnesses firsthand and thus is able more accu-
rately to "get a feel for the case."'171 Also, the trial court may have an
institutional advantage over the appellate court in terms of the
170. Evidence can include that which might be inadmissible at trial, such as
evidence presented in settlement conferences and other pretrial activities.
171. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947); see
also United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (describing
the importance of trial court discretion when the decision depends on direct
observation of the litigation); Friendly, supra note 72, at 759 (discussing the
deference given to the trial court's factual determinations on appellate review);
Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D.
173, 182-83 (1975) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Appellate Review] (describing the
"you are there" reason for appellate deference to the trial court's ruling in ap-
propriate circumstances); Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra note 72, at
663 (noting that the trial judge observes and perceives more than an appellate
court and therefore has much discretion in many areas).
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volume of cases that it routinely decides which involve a particular
issue.
172
Another reason arises from the impracticability of devising a
single rule of law to cover all possible scenarios of a given situation
which a trial judge will confront. 173 The Supreme Court found this
to be a particularly compelling reason for using an abuse of discre-
tion standard in reviewing a trial court's award of attorney fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 174 In that instance, the Su-
preme Court asked whether the question in issue is amenable to gen-
eralization or is instead diverse and "likely to profit from the experi-
ence that an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop."
175
Although surely more secondary in nature, other reasons for
limiting appellate review are cited by legal scholars: judicial econ-
omy, finality, and morale. 176 Appellate courts already have more
cases than they can expeditiously handle, and letting the final word
rest in the hands of the trial court helps to establish a certain sense of
order and finality. A litigant expecting an appellate court to uphold
the trial court's ruling on appeal is less likely to challenge every un-
favorable decision; hence, when discord arises, the trial judge can
more quickly restore order and tranquility. 177 Likewise, limiting ap-
pellate review assists in preserving the morale of trial judges. A trial
judge who fears that "appellate Big Brothers" are watching with a
critical eye and are prepared to overrule every trial court decision can
become dispirited.
178
172. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-99 (1996) (dealing
with a trial court's criminal sentencing discretion). For example, the Court
remarked that since a clear majority of Guidelines cases are disposed of in dis-
trict courts (93.9% of Guidelines cases were never appealed in 1994), district
courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts. See id.
173. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 72, at 760; Rosenberg, Appellate Review,
supra note 171, at 181; Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra note 72, at 662
("Many questions that arise in litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule
because they involve multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly
resist generalization.. ").
174. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
175. Id. at 562.
176. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra note 72, at 660-62.
177. See id. at 661-62.
178. See id. at 661. The concern of demoralizing trial judges by appellate
review was aptly presented by Judge Magruder in The Trials and Tribulations
of an Intermediate Appellate Court:
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Perhaps more to the point than any of the other reasons for
vesting the adjudicator with discretion is the rationale that flexibility
of the law best carries out policy goals. Lee Decker proffers such an
explanation in his analysis of Rule 11 sanctions. 179 The principle
purpose of Rule 11 is to deter conduct that will frustrate the aims of
Rule 11, which are "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action."' 80 Decker notes that parties would
more likely appeal a denial of Rule 11 sanctions if Rule 11 determi-
nations were subject to de novo review rather than abuse of discre-
tion review. 181 A litigant who carries the heavy burden of proving
that the trial court committed "clear error" is more likely to be dis-
couraged from appealing than one who seeks an appeal under de
novo review. 182 Thus, unlike the appeal incentives that de novo re-
view may possibly create, the prospect of an abuse of discretion re-
view may actually prevent unnecessary and costly litigation.
183
B. Justification for De Novo Review
Countervailing considerations give rise to several reasons for
applying a de novo standard. First, a litigant in a trial court faces a
single judge whose assessments may be uniquely biased or colored.
Appellate review, on the other hand, consists of a panel of judges
rather than one single judge. This collegiality of an appellate panel
helps to "curtail decisions based on impermissible factors."
184
As to the trial judges, we must always bear in mind that they may be
as good lawyers as we are, or better. They are under the disadvantage
of often having to make rulings off the cuff, so to speak, in the press
and urgency of a trial proceeding .... Hence, we should approach our
task of judicial review with a certain genuine humility. We should
never unnecessarily try to make a monkey of the judge in the court
below, or to trespass on his feelings or dignity and self-respect.
44 CoRNELLL.Q. 1, 3 (1958).
179. See D. Lee Decker, Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues-De Novo
or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 BYU
L. REv. 877.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's
note (describing the 1983 amendment which seeks to remedy abuses by
"building upon and expanding" courts' abilities to award expenses).
181. See Decker, supra note 179, at 887.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Friendly, supra note 72, at 757 ("I am not thinking of the rare cases of
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In addition, an appellate panel typically has more time and resources
at its disposal for adjudicating disputes, which usually become more
sharply focused on appeal. 185 Still another reason for recommending
de novo review is tradition: History favors de novo review because
the right to appeal has long been part of our nation's judicial process
even though the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee this
right.
186
Finally, de novo review can promote uniformity and predict-
ability in the application of laws that an abuse of discretion standard
cannot. 187 De novo review breeds uniformity by providing an ap-
pellate court with the opportunity to review the record anew and to
reverse the trial court on any inconsistency it finds in applications of
the law. With over 500 trial judges in the federal circuit courts of
appeal as of 1982 and limited Supreme Court review, 188 clearly uni-
formity and predictability are of concern in discretionary matters.
Nevertheless, complete uniformity is understandably an unattainable
goal since the thirteen circuit courts of appeal each have an uncertain
number of panels, which are themselves inconsistent in applying the
law.
venality or of prejudice in its most pejorative sense, but rather of the subcon-
scious mind-set from which few judges are immune.").
185. But see id. Judge Friendly points out that, in reality, appellate courts
are often as crunched for time as trial courts and therefore may not have more
time available for research and deliberations than that available at the trial
level. See id.
186. See id. at 756; Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra note 72, at 641-42
("[U]nreviewable discretion offends a deep sense of fitness in our view of the
administration of justice. We are committed to the practice of affording a two-
tiered or three-tiered court system, so that a losing litigant may obtain at least
one chance for review of each significant ruling made at the trial-court level.").
187. See KENNETH CULP DAVIs, DIsCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIINARY
INQUIRY 107 (1969) (discussing how the widening of discretion on appeal can
help to "locate the optimum degree of binding effect of precedents"); see also
Friendly, supra note 72, at 758 ("[T]he most basic principle of jurisprudence
[is] that 'we must act alike in all cases of like nature."') (quoting Ward v.
James, 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A. 1966), which is quoting Lord Mansfield in Rex
v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 335 (1770)).
188. See Friendly, supra note 72, at 758.
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VII. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STANDARD AS APPLIED
Based on the foregoing discussion regarding the justifications
behind the de novo and abuse standards, it is clear why equitable de-
fenses, such as laches and equitable estoppel, are committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge-(1) the close relationship be-
tween the trial judge and the parties and (2) the unique facts of each
case that are necessary to establish the elements of the equitable de-
fense. Regardless, there are several compelling justifications for
limiting the contours of this discretion-particularly on summary
judgment-and for permitting the Federal Circuit to engage in ple-
nary review of the record for ascertaining whether an abuse has been
committed.
A. Position of the Appellate Court
A major justification offered for applying an abuse of discretion
standard in the laches and equitable estoppel contexts is the district
court's intimate familiarity with the case and its evidence. 8 9 On
summary judgment, however, the district court usually does not have
available any more evidence than the appellate court will have on
appeal. For instance, on summary judgment the district court does
not weigh the testimony of witnesses for credibility, nor does it make
findings of fact. 190 Moreover, the argument that trial courts are gen-
erally more familiar than appellate courts with the question at issue
because they hear more cases dealing with that issue-an argument
made by the Court in Koon' 91-- does not apply to patent cases since
there is only one appellant court for patent cases-the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. In fact, Congress created the Federal
Circuit as the sole appellate court for patent cases in order to harmo-
nize patent law decisions among district courts. 192 Understandably,
the Federal Circuit is actually more familiar than the district courts
with patent law questions raised on appeal because of its specializa-
tion in patent law and the sheer number of cases it reviews on appeal.
189. See supra Part VI.
190. See, e.g., 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2712, at 574-78 (2d ed. 1983).
191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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B. Goals of the Equitable Defenses and of Summary Judgment
The purposes of laches and equitable estoppel-even in a sum-
mary judgment context-also support a more searching standard of
review. As stated in A. C. Aukerman, the primary purpose of laches
is finality: "[Laches] assures that old grievances will some day be
laid to rest... [which] [i]nevitably... means that some potentially
meritorious demands will not be entertained[,] ... [b]ut there is jus-
tice too in an end to conflict and in the quiet of peace."'193 The pri-
mary principle governing equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is
ethicality, i.e., morality: 'The vital principle is that he who by his
language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise
have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disap-
pointing the expectations upon which he acted.
' " 94
To this end, to achieve both finality and ethicality, a district
court must view the facts of the case and make a discretionary deci-
sion regarding laches or equitable estoppel. However, when this de-
cision is made on summary judgment, the contours of this discretion
are altered by the very fact that this is a summary judgment pro-
ceeding.
The primary goal of summary judgment is to determine expedi-
tiously the merit of claims and defenses so that unmeritorious claims
do not bring about unnecessary expense and delay to the defending
party.195 Since a grant of summary judgment denies a litigant its day
in court as a matter of law, such litigant ought to be afforded an op-
portunity for the correction of legal errors and of decisions based on
erroneous facts. Therefore, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the appropriate standard of review for a grant of summary judgment
is de novo. 196 Anything less than de novo review could have the
deleterious effect of eliminating meritorious claims.
197
193. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citation omitted).
194. Mahoning Inv. Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 622, 629 (Ct. Cl. 1933)
(quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879)).
195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note.
196. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Indeed,
the Federal Circuit has also acknowledged that the appropriate standard of re-
view for all summary judgment rulings is de novo. See, e.g., Cohen v. United
States, 995 F.2d 205, 207 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that "[tihe question of
the propriety of summary judgment itself is subject to complete and independ-
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Likewise, when a laches or equitable estoppel determination is
made on summary judgment, a litigant-who has lost its day in
court-ought to have the opportunity for review under the more
searching, de novo, standard. To be sure, summary judgment rulings
involving laches or equitable estoppel are potentially prone to factual
errors since these defenses are highly fact-intensive and since fact-
finding that involves the resolution of factual disputes is entirely in-
appropriate on summary judgment.
198
Moreover, even though a reviewing court typically affords great
deference to factual matters, 199 this does not mean that the Federal
Circuit owes any more deference to a laches or equitable estoppel
determination than is owed to other summary judgment rulings.
2 00
Summary judgment rulings that involve issues arguably more factual
in nature than laches or estoppel-such as negligence 2 01 or the rea-
sonableness of a police officer's actions2P2-are reviewed on a de
ent review by the Federal Circuit"); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990
F.2d 1237, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that "[i]n reviewing a grant or denial
of summary judgment, [the Federal Circuit] must make an independent deter-
mination as to whether the standards of Rule 56(c) have been met").
197. "The purpose of Rule 56 is to avoid an unnecessary trial, but it must be
used carefully because an improper grant of summary judgment 'may deny a
party a chance to prove a worthy case."' Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc., 912
F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), overruled on other
grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1038-39 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en bane).
198. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 39, at 348; see also Meyers, 912 F.2d
at 1461 ("The district court cannot engage in fact-finding on a motion for
summary judgment."), overruled on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 103 8-39 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en bane).
199. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
200. Discretionary choices are left "not to [a court's] inclination, but to its
judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles." United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (Marshall,
C.J.).
201. See, e.g., Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d
943 (8th Cir. 1998); Copeland v. K MART Corp., No. 97-35333, 1998 WL
560759 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998); Rodman Indus., Inc. v. G & S Mill, Inc., 145
F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 1998); Camacho v. Du Sung Corp., 121 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir.
1997); King v. Crossland Say. Bank, 111 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1997).
202. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
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novo basis. At the very least, a summary judgment ruling concern-
ing laches or equitable estoppel is not more fact-intensive than those
dealing with negligence or reasonableness.
C. Uniformity and Predictability
One of the principal reasons for affording full appellate review
of certain determinations is to foster uniformity and predictability in
the application of laws.203 When given an opportunity to review the
record anew with little or no deference to the trial court, the appellate
court can make consistent and independent rulings and thereby clar-
ify the law.2 °4 All the same, the Court in Koon noted that de novo
review of fact-intensive issues would not completely alleviate dis-
parity and lack of uniformity in criminal sentencing, simply because
too many appellate courts are involved.2 °5
For patent infringement litigation, the situation is radically dif-
ferent since only one appellate court, the Federal Circuit, hears all
patent appeal cases. To be sure, Congress passed the Federal Courts
Improvements Act of 1982,206 creating the Federal Circuit, to cure
the lack of uniformity in patent law.20 7 Prior to passage of this Act,
the regional appellate courts heard patent cases on appeal. Since
some circuits appeared to favor the patentee over the infringer or vice
versa,208 this arrangement led to forum shopping and unpredictability
203. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 585 (1988) (White, J., dis-
senting); Friendly, supra note 72, at 758.
204. See Decker, supra note 179, at 890-91.
205. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996) (citing Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (citing Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989))).
206. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292-1295 (1994).
207. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 13 (acknowledging that the lack of Supreme Court review for most patent
cases due to its full docket supports forming a centralized appellate court to
clarify the law); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Im-
provement Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 387-88
(1983).
208. For example, the Eighth Circuit, over a period of nearly twenty years,
invalidated 88% of the patents that it reviewed. See Coe A. Bloomberg, In
Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 262 & nn.46-47
(1993) (citing GLORIA KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS, app. 13, tbl. 13c (1974)).
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in the area of patent rights2 09-- an area in which Congress has since
determined a critical need for uniformity.210 This need for uniform-
ity and predictability stems from the special requirements concerning
technological innovation and business planning.211 Judge Newman
of the Federal Circuit stated with clarity the need for uniformity in
patent laws and also the need for a single court for patent appeals:
A centralized court that understands the processes of inven-
tion and innovation, and the economic and scientific pur-
poses of a patent system, would be expected to apply a
more consistent interpretation of the standards of patent-
ability and the other complex provisions of the patent stat-
ute. With a consistent nationwide application of the law, I
would hope for and expect a greatly enhanced degree of
predictability of the outcome of patent litigation. The pre-
dictability that patents improvidently granted will be held
invalid is of no less interest to us as manufacturers and pur-
veyors of goods than the predictability that patents will be
held valid if they represent proper protection of a valuable
investment in innovative technology. As in all contested
situations, a more predictable outcome may encourage the
contestants to avoid litigation.
212
209. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 361-62, 369-71 (1976).
210. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 13.
211. See Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1981: Hearings on H.R.
2405 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Jus-
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981)
(statement of Hon. Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals) (commenting that the Act would eliminate the
uncertainty in patent law adjudication); see id. at 50 (statement of Julius Jan-
cin, Jr., President-elect, American Patent Law Association) (commenting that a
uniform law on patents will foster technology and add certainty in attorney de-
cisionmaking and advice).
212. The Honorable Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stabil-
ity or JudicialActivism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 687 (1993) (quoting Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1981-S. 21 and State Justice Act of 1981-S. 537:
Hearings on S. 21 and S. 537 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 232 (1981)).
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D. Substantial Consequences of Equitable Defenses
Lastly, the financial and economic implications involved in most
patent infringement suits provide one final justification for the Fed-
eral Circuit's present approach to review. Even the Supreme Court
has noted that decisions with substantial consequences need more
intensive review.213 Patent litigation typically runs into tens of thou-
sands of dollars, and the award or loss of damages therefrom typi-
cally runs into the millions.214 Equally important, the loss of patent
rights could have a significant impact on an entire industry; 215 there-
fore, the effect of granting a summary judgment motion on laches
and equitable estoppel is just "the sort of decision that ordinarily has
... substantial consequences."
216
E. Legitimization of the Federal Circuit's Approach
1. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,217 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of the appropriate standard of review for Rule 11
sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court
concluded that a district judge's determination on all Rule 11 issues
213. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562-63 (1988) (acknowledging
that the unusually high award of attorney's fees militated against using an
abuse of discretion standard but ultimately adopting the deferential standard).
214. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1363, 1373 (D. Del. 1990) (Burroughs Wellcome claimed to have spent more
than $2.5 million in the lawsuit); Federal Circuit Rejects Appeal of $12 Million
Judgment in Suit over PET Process, ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP.,
June 4, 1997, at 9.
215. Many commentators acknowledge that the future of the biotechnology
industry is largely dependent on its ability to both acquire and defend proprie-
tary rights. See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, US Patent Application Stirs Up
Gene Hunters, 353 NATURE 485, 486 (1991); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents
and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CmI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); Adam L. Streltzer, Comment, U.S. Biotechnology
Intellectual Property Rights as an Obstacle to the UNCED Convention on
Biological Diversity: It Just Doesn't Matter, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 271, 276-84
(1993).
216. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563.
217. 496 U.S. 384 (1990), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in
Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon Agents, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 449 (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
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should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 21  At the time of this
opinion, the circuit courts were split on the issue of the appropriate
standard of review for a district court's Rule 11 legal conclusions.
2 19
In the midst of this uncertainty, petitioner Cooter & Gell called for
the adoption of a three-tiered standard of review like that adopted in
the Ninth Circuit.220 In resolving the issue, the Court likened Rule
11 determinations to the EAJA determinations examined in Pierce v.
Underwood2 2 ' The Court noted that "EAJA [determinations] re-
quire[] an inquiry similar to the Rule 11 inquiry whether a pleading
is 'well grounded in fact' and legally tenable."222 Accordingly, the
Court found that not only did the Pierce factors22 3 provide strong
support for adopting an abuse of discretion standard, but also the
policy goal behind Rule lI--deterrence of sham litigation-further
218. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405.
219. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit "reviews find-
ings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard, the determination
that counsel violated Rule 11 under a de novo standard, and the choice of
sanction under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. at 399 (citing Zaldivar v.
Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, on the other hand, followed an abuse of discretion stan-
dard for "the determination whether a filing had an insufficient factual basis or
was interposed for an improper purpose, but review[ed] de novo the question
whether a pleading or motion is legally sufficient." Id. (citing International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Association of Flight Attendants, 864 F.2d 173, 176
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)).
Yet a majority of the circuits follow an abuse of discretion standard for all
Rule 11 issues. See id. at 399-400 (citing, for example, Kale v. Combined Ins.
Co., 861 F.2d 746, 757-58 (1st Cir. 1988); Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v.
Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986)). For an excellent discus-
sion of the standard of review for Rule 11 sanctions, see GEORGENE M. VAIRO,
RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES
§ 8.04 (2d ed. 1992).
220. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 399.
221. See id. at 403-04; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)
(ruling that the appropriate standard of review of attorney fees awarded under
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) was abuse of discretion).
222. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 403.
223. These factors include (1) the better position of the trial court in deciding
certain matters; and (2) the fact that some issues are "little susceptible ... of
useful generalization" because they are so fact-intensive. See id. at 403-04
(citation omitted).
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justified the adoption of an abuse of discretion standard.2 24 Since a
district court is quite familiar with the litigation practices of its local
bar, it is in a better position than an appellate court to ascertain
whether a sanction would serve as a general deterrent to future sham
litigation.225  Furthermore, in considering the Pierce factors, the
Court indicated that, as in EAJA determinations, district courts han-
dle Rule 11 determinations better because they are the direct recipi-
ents of the evidence.22 6 Moreover, courts of appeal need not "invest
time and energy in the unproductive task of determining 2 27 what the
law formerly was at the time the attorney filed the pleading papers.
Having appeals courts engage in such a task fails "'to produce the
normal law-clarifying benefits that come from an appellate decision
on a question of law."'
22 8
Further, the Court stated that even though the issue before it was
"whether the court of appeals must defer to the district court's legal
conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings," 229 an abuse of discretion stan-
dard would not contravene such an analysis:
Of course, this standard would not preclude the appellate
court's correction of a district court's legal errors, . . . or
relying on a materially incorrect view of the relevant law..
. An appellate court would be justified in concluding that,
in making such errors, the district court abused its discre-
tion.23°
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that in light of the pur-
poses and policies behind Rule 11, the appropriate standard to adopt
in reviewing all aspects of a Rule 11 determination is abuse of dis-
cretion. 231 But in so holding, it provided a caveat: "A district court
would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an er-
roneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence. 232
224. See id. at 404.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 403.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 404 (citation omitted).
229. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 402.
231. See id. at 405.
232. Id.
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Hence, the Supreme Court reveals that, in conducting an
"abuse" inquiry, it is appropriate for the Federal Circuit to make its
own determination as to whether the trial court applied the correct
legal standards and justifiably weighed the evidence. All of these
determinations are made in the name of "abuse of discretion."
2. Koon v. United States
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has reiterated in a recent case,
Koon v. United States,233 that the discretion owed to a district court's
legal conclusion may depend on the issue on appeal. In Koon, the
Court was faced with resolving the standard of review afforded to
discretionary criminal sentencing decisions. There the Court stated:
That the district court retains.much of its traditional discre-
tion does not mean appellate review is an empty exercise...
The deference that is due depends on the nature of the
question presented. The district court may be owed no def-
erence... [when] the appellate court... [is] in as good a
position to consider the question as the district court was in
the first instance.234
Then the Court went on to say:
Little turns, however, on whether we label review of [a
question of law] abuse of discretion or de novo, for an
abuse-of-discretion standard does not mean a mistake of
law is beyond appellate correction. . . . The abuse-of-
discretion standard includes review to determine that the
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.
235
With these statements, the Court has eloquently clarified that a de
novo component is inherent in an abuse of discretion standard of re-
view. Thus, the Federal Circuit's approach-less than true defer-
ence-is in line with Supreme Court rulings.
233. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
234. Id. at 98.
235. Id. at 100.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Comment concludes that, for a summary judgment ruling
on laches and equitable estoppel, the Federal Circuit engages in some
form of plenary review even under the abuse of discretion standard.
Although the "abuse of discretion" label itself does not reveal "how"
the Federal Circuit will review a district court's conclusion, a review
of the case law on the issue gives "life" to this abuse of discretion
standard.
Additionally, this Comment contends that the Federal Circuit's
application is both legitimate and desirable. Not only is the applica-
tion of this standard clearly in keeping with Supreme Court prece-
dent; but also it is desirable given (1) the position of the Federal Cir-
cuit, (2) the need for uniformity in patent law, and (3) the substantial
consequences of these equitable defenses. Accordingly, the contours
of a district court's discretion are not unaccountably broad. Thus,
the standard of review that the Federal Circuit has adopted seems to
be an appropriate and desirable standard-at least for now. Future
demands from industry and technology may well require this stan-
dard to evolve further. The legal system and its standards of review
are not static creations but organic, living ones; and they must con-
tinue responding and developing in order to meet the needs of soci-
ety.
Whether sitting in corporate boardrooms or tinkering in back-
yard laboratories, potential litigants in patent disputes and their attor-
neys can take heart that a district court's summary judgment ruling
on laches or equitable estoppel will not go unchecked. The abuse of
discretion standard inherently contains its own de novo component.
Because of this de novo component, an appellant who has lost its day
in court on an issue can effectively have a second bite at the apple.
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